Iraqi Police
[From Katrina, working with a company doing oversight work for US infrastructure contractors and the Iraqi interim government in Iraq and Turkey.]
Police Academy
The above link provides some information on police training, such as what is necessary to join a police force in New York, as well as to extend that basic training and help the policeman gain further skills and become more effective. It also includes some basic fees, which of course in this case paid by the recruit or officer. In the case of Iraq, these costs would be primarily carried by the US military and the State Dept.
The basic course takes about four months, with additional courses varying from a few hours to several days. The basic course allows the recruit to become a basic officer, but doesn't provide much in the way of advanced training for more involved situations. And as one might expect, only the most advanced courses prepare the officer to deal with the types of activities many Iraqi police officers could expect to encounter on a somewhat regular basis.
And of course, all of this information is being applied to officers being trained in a very secure environment and being trained by professionals sharing the same language, which is not something Iraqi recruits can claim.
In the most worthwhile paragraph from the New York Times article, the general mentions the need for the ongoing construction of the Iraqi police infrastructure. Selecting, reviewing, and where necessary replacing leaders cannot be performed magically or without taking time and attention.
It's no different from building a civilian company, where systems are designed, people are trained, and then over time adjustments are made to both to make the company operate smoothly and effectively. It's an ongoing process that has to expand as the size of the company, or the police force in this case, expands.
This concept that everything can be done overnight is one which we seldom are willing to place upon ourselves in our own performance but, at least in the US, seem to be increasingly willing to thrust upon everyone else. While we want months to produce some simple result while we waste time on anything but our own work, we expect miracles of everyone else in theirs, from our military in Iraq to our power companies after major hurricanes.
And this is plainly ridiculous to anyone who pauses long enough to give matters a thought. These people are not cozy in their homes or offices and safe from all the riffraff. They are functioning in a difficult and sometimes hostile environment and yet they are still managing to produce a decent, if not perfect product.
Recent congressional investigations have revealed problems with the rate of training of Iraqi security forces and police. Several hundred thousand dollars have revealed to US leadership things that probably any Iraqi, US soldier or foreign contractor could have told them in a simple phone call. But with US leadership, the problem isn't something to be solved. It's something to be politicized and cheapened.
Of course, this is just my opinion, but at least I have the experience of being part of projects in Iraq and am familiar with the multitude of basic difficulties being faced and overcome there on a daily basis. But if I were just to read this New York Times article without any such knowledge, or without stopping to simply add the well-known factors into the story, I would be led to believe that the administration and the military had produced absolutely nothing but a failure in their training program, all because they were just sitting around twiddling their fingers.
No, the media isn't biased at all.
Effort to Train New Iraqi Army Is Facing Delays
New York Times
September 20, 2004
"Their capabilities are still uneven, but they're improving as we arm and equip them better, improve their infrastructure, give them additional training, and help them weed out the weak leaders," one American general said. "Nothing's quick in Iraq and nothing's easy."
Police Academy
The above link provides some information on police training, such as what is necessary to join a police force in New York, as well as to extend that basic training and help the policeman gain further skills and become more effective. It also includes some basic fees, which of course in this case paid by the recruit or officer. In the case of Iraq, these costs would be primarily carried by the US military and the State Dept.
The basic course takes about four months, with additional courses varying from a few hours to several days. The basic course allows the recruit to become a basic officer, but doesn't provide much in the way of advanced training for more involved situations. And as one might expect, only the most advanced courses prepare the officer to deal with the types of activities many Iraqi police officers could expect to encounter on a somewhat regular basis.
And of course, all of this information is being applied to officers being trained in a very secure environment and being trained by professionals sharing the same language, which is not something Iraqi recruits can claim.
In the most worthwhile paragraph from the New York Times article, the general mentions the need for the ongoing construction of the Iraqi police infrastructure. Selecting, reviewing, and where necessary replacing leaders cannot be performed magically or without taking time and attention.
It's no different from building a civilian company, where systems are designed, people are trained, and then over time adjustments are made to both to make the company operate smoothly and effectively. It's an ongoing process that has to expand as the size of the company, or the police force in this case, expands.
This concept that everything can be done overnight is one which we seldom are willing to place upon ourselves in our own performance but, at least in the US, seem to be increasingly willing to thrust upon everyone else. While we want months to produce some simple result while we waste time on anything but our own work, we expect miracles of everyone else in theirs, from our military in Iraq to our power companies after major hurricanes.
And this is plainly ridiculous to anyone who pauses long enough to give matters a thought. These people are not cozy in their homes or offices and safe from all the riffraff. They are functioning in a difficult and sometimes hostile environment and yet they are still managing to produce a decent, if not perfect product.
Recent congressional investigations have revealed problems with the rate of training of Iraqi security forces and police. Several hundred thousand dollars have revealed to US leadership things that probably any Iraqi, US soldier or foreign contractor could have told them in a simple phone call. But with US leadership, the problem isn't something to be solved. It's something to be politicized and cheapened.
Of course, this is just my opinion, but at least I have the experience of being part of projects in Iraq and am familiar with the multitude of basic difficulties being faced and overcome there on a daily basis. But if I were just to read this New York Times article without any such knowledge, or without stopping to simply add the well-known factors into the story, I would be led to believe that the administration and the military had produced absolutely nothing but a failure in their training program, all because they were just sitting around twiddling their fingers.
No, the media isn't biased at all.
Labels: Iraq, Kat the Contractor, media, MSM
