'Tet' in Baghdad
The "insurgents" in Iraq are putting on a textbook media blitz. Look at what they accomplished with this attack and the Reuters reporting.
For the price of a handful of dead-end jihadi cannon fodder and some collateral damage that made fresh corpses of innocent women who had gone out looking for fresh vegetables, Zarqawi killed some Iraqi police. But that in itself means nothing; his real "victory" was this news story, which presents his organization to the world as defiant and capable of launching co-ordinated attacks that can't be stopped.
That's the "Tet Offensive" tactic, in which the underdog in the fight, whom everyone knows can't win it outright, claims success by merely continuing to exist, and getting its pictures into the media. This somehow makes its eventual victory seem inevitable, because the leadership and voters of the Western democracies sense they don't have the grim determination to drive the stake into the heart of rebels who are willing to take the heavy losses and wait for the Americans to get tired and go home.
The actual Tet offensive of 1968 was a massive defeat for the North Vietnamese; it failed to provoke the popular uprising they had expected, nor did it achieve any tactical success. It crippled their army and left them with heavy losses that took time to replace. But the effect on the American political leadership, based on how the battles were presented in the Western media, was instant and completely demoralizing. The Vietnamese communists discovered this tactic by accident. The Islamists have honed it deliberately.
Britain's leftist Guardian newspaper, rooting more openly for an Anglo-American debacle in Iraq than a U.S. newspaper ever would, understands this well. An "insurgent" attack on Baghdad's biggent police fortress is beaten off with heavy losses, well described in the Guardian's reportage, but the headline reads, "Iraq insurgents snatch victory from defeat."
The reporter quotes Lt. Col. David Funk, the U.S. infantry commander responsible for the area: "The enemy spent weeks, maybe months planning this. They failed spectacularly." And it cites him as giving credit to the "heroism of the beleaguered police officers." But, that out of the way, the article devotes far more time to building up the "Tet" story.
The reporter, given a tour of the battlefield by U.S. and Iraqi authorities, writes of damage that "testified to a synchronised and audacious strike by up to 100 rebels in what is supposed to be a locked-down capital."
The article said Funk "worried about similarities to the Tet offensive, a 1968 push by North Vietnamese forces which failed militarily but whose scale and surprise gave the impression that the US and its allies were failing." One wonders if he "worried" about that until he was asked point-blank about it by the Guardian reporter, who at least had the dignity to print Funk's reply:
Yet if both the reporter and his source are talking about this tactic, in which the media coverage itself is turned into a weapon by one side in the war, how can the media ignore or deny its centrality in the equation? Look at the Guardian's descriptive clause: "whose scale and surprise gave the impression that the US and its allies were failing." What's missing? The who, as in who "gave the impression," etc.
Or, to phrase the question another way, how does a Western media that is overcome by vapors when it discovers a gay right-wing plant in the White House press corps, thus compromising its driven-snow purity, shrug off repeated manipulation by medieval religious thugs?
Sometimes the observer becomes part of the story. This is one of those times. Then the observer has to begin questioning himself like any other player. And he ought to do the honest thing and admit he is no longer a mere observer. If he fails that, he will find his audience turns away in disgust.
Omar at Iraq the Model, read this article, too, and was furious. He, being an Iraqi who has devoted his life, fortune, and sacred honor to building a free and democratic state in his homeland, lists all the obvious ways this should have been written as a straight: "insurgent attack fails" story:
He's correct, of course, but he grew up without exposure to the "Tet" tactic, whereby a media that wishes, openly or secretly, to boost "the other side" in a military fight involving home troops, manages to form a silent alliance with the enemy and sap public and political commitment at home by presenting even catastrophic losses by the enemy as moral or symbolic victories. All under the guise of neutral fact-gathering.
In the space of a few hours a suicide car bomber wrecked a police headquarters, an attack on an Iraqi army base killed at least 15 people and four police were killed when a bomber walked into Mosul's General Hospital and blew himself up.
The third attack, on a police post inside the hospital, damaged the emergency ward where casualties had been brought from the previous incidents. Six policemen and nine civilians were wounded, police told a Reuters reporter at the scene.
... The car bomber drove at a district police headquarters at Bab al-Toob in the city center, striking a rear wall to bring down a section of the old, two-storey building and devastate surrounding market stalls as people started the working day.
For the price of a handful of dead-end jihadi cannon fodder and some collateral damage that made fresh corpses of innocent women who had gone out looking for fresh vegetables, Zarqawi killed some Iraqi police. But that in itself means nothing; his real "victory" was this news story, which presents his organization to the world as defiant and capable of launching co-ordinated attacks that can't be stopped.
That's the "Tet Offensive" tactic, in which the underdog in the fight, whom everyone knows can't win it outright, claims success by merely continuing to exist, and getting its pictures into the media. This somehow makes its eventual victory seem inevitable, because the leadership and voters of the Western democracies sense they don't have the grim determination to drive the stake into the heart of rebels who are willing to take the heavy losses and wait for the Americans to get tired and go home.
The actual Tet offensive of 1968 was a massive defeat for the North Vietnamese; it failed to provoke the popular uprising they had expected, nor did it achieve any tactical success. It crippled their army and left them with heavy losses that took time to replace. But the effect on the American political leadership, based on how the battles were presented in the Western media, was instant and completely demoralizing. The Vietnamese communists discovered this tactic by accident. The Islamists have honed it deliberately.
Britain's leftist Guardian newspaper, rooting more openly for an Anglo-American debacle in Iraq than a U.S. newspaper ever would, understands this well. An "insurgent" attack on Baghdad's biggent police fortress is beaten off with heavy losses, well described in the Guardian's reportage, but the headline reads, "Iraq insurgents snatch victory from defeat."
The reporter quotes Lt. Col. David Funk, the U.S. infantry commander responsible for the area: "The enemy spent weeks, maybe months planning this. They failed spectacularly." And it cites him as giving credit to the "heroism of the beleaguered police officers." But, that out of the way, the article devotes far more time to building up the "Tet" story.
But in Baghdad, the fact the insurgents had launched the attack at all was more indicative.
The reporter, given a tour of the battlefield by U.S. and Iraqi authorities, writes of damage that "testified to a synchronised and audacious strike by up to 100 rebels in what is supposed to be a locked-down capital."
The combination of heavy shelling, diversionary feints, infantry thrusts and suicide vehicles - the "precision-guided" equivalent of tanks - left parts of the district of Hi al-Elam a smoking ruin. If the objective was to overrun the station and free its prisoners the offensive failed. The attackers retreated after two hours, leaving dozens dead and captured. But if the objective was to send a message of power and determination it succeeded.
Residents said their confidence in the government and security forces was severely dented. A rash of graffiti has spread across the area: "We will be back." One taxi driver, a Shia who loathes the mostly Sunni Arab resistance, shrugged. "Yes, they will."
... Last month the government said Operation Lightning, a sweep of the capital by 40,000 troops, would choke the violence. A spate of explosions in the past two days killed more than 40 people but it was the spectacular but less bloody attack at Baya'a that showed the resistance was still in business.
Videos of the assault will almost certainly surface on the internet, the dramatic images of resistance intended to inspire would-be recruits and demoralise opponents.
The article said Funk "worried about similarities to the Tet offensive, a 1968 push by North Vietnamese forces which failed militarily but whose scale and surprise gave the impression that the US and its allies were failing." One wonders if he "worried" about that until he was asked point-blank about it by the Guardian reporter, who at least had the dignity to print Funk's reply:
"The media got Tet wrong and they're getting Iraq wrong. We are winning but people won't know that if all they are hearing about is death and violence."
Yet if both the reporter and his source are talking about this tactic, in which the media coverage itself is turned into a weapon by one side in the war, how can the media ignore or deny its centrality in the equation? Look at the Guardian's descriptive clause: "whose scale and surprise gave the impression that the US and its allies were failing." What's missing? The who, as in who "gave the impression," etc.
Or, to phrase the question another way, how does a Western media that is overcome by vapors when it discovers a gay right-wing plant in the White House press corps, thus compromising its driven-snow purity, shrug off repeated manipulation by medieval religious thugs?
Sometimes the observer becomes part of the story. This is one of those times. Then the observer has to begin questioning himself like any other player. And he ought to do the honest thing and admit he is no longer a mere observer. If he fails that, he will find his audience turns away in disgust.
Omar at Iraq the Model, read this article, too, and was furious. He, being an Iraqi who has devoted his life, fortune, and sacred honor to building a free and democratic state in his homeland, lists all the obvious ways this should have been written as a straight: "insurgent attack fails" story:
- The attack was successfully repelled. Now does that make it a victory for the aggressors? I guess not.
- Reinforcements weren't available during the critical phase of the battle as they couldn't make their way to the battle scene but this didn't deter the IP men from fighting and defending their station independently and I guess everyone agrees that policemen are not supposed to fight against men armed with RPGs and mortars; at least that's true in the vast majority of countries but our IP men accepted the challenge and won.
- It was mainly the bravery and good training of one Iraqi policeman that "turned the tide" according to the paper itself.
Now, one gunner was able to turn the tide and this - in my opinion - is a big sign of skill and organized defense. Still, the Guardian wants us to believe it was a victory for the insurgents!- By the end of the battle, at least 10 terrorists were found killed and some 40 were arrested. What a victorious battle those terrorists planned for!
- Finally and actually most important is that during the battle, people from the mixed Sunni and She'at neighborhood called 55 times and provided tips to the IP about the movements of the terrorists.
He's correct, of course, but he grew up without exposure to the "Tet" tactic, whereby a media that wishes, openly or secretly, to boost "the other side" in a military fight involving home troops, manages to form a silent alliance with the enemy and sap public and political commitment at home by presenting even catastrophic losses by the enemy as moral or symbolic victories. All under the guise of neutral fact-gathering.
