Was It Worth It?
Tigerhawk preserves some of the left-blog reactions to the U.S. strike a week ago on a house in remote Pakistan, where we thought we'd catch Ayman al-Zawahiri. We didn't, and this was quickly realized and reported within a few hours of the strike.
For the next couple of days, the story was that the strike was a failure. Either it had been was based on bad information, or the missiles hit a house where al Zawahiri could have been, but wasn't.
Editorials railed against yet another case of bungling U.S. intelligence and fresh enemies made. Yesterday, though, it took a twist and, though there are no bodies to show, Pakistan now says four important al-Qaida leaders died in the attack. Time and grave-digging will tell whether this was so. Let's hope it is.
What was so predictable that it required no digging was the anti-war reaction to all this. First came the big pile-on. Tigerhawk picks some typical examples:
And so forth. Tigerhawk notes:
Yes, I can attest to that, too. The most intense of the anti-war crowd I work with was positively gleeful over the morbid error, when it was thought to be such. It dispelled all his doubt (and lovely silence) after France rattled its nuclear sabre and upset the neat ordering of his world into Cowboy Warmonger Shrubbie vs. All the Good People Everywhere.
Then when he saw the headline that told of al-Qaida deaths in the attack, he refused to believe it: "Boy, they're really trying to spin this one!" He'd rather see dead innocents, as long as they are held against America, than dead terrorists.
Tigerhawk again:
Some of the commentators Tigerhawk quotes drew parallels to the Clinton missile strike on a Sudanese target after the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He ordered a missile strike against Al Shifa, a Khartoum pharmaceutical plant which intelligence reports said was manufacturing a precursor ingredient for nerve gas with Bin Ladin’s financial support.
Once again, the balancing act between uncertain intelligence and certain fears is worth watching. The same discussions, with different nouns, played out in the Bush Administration before the Iraq war. From the 9/11 commission report:
[emphasis added]
In fact, no evidence has since emerged to corroborate the CIA's view that this plant was involved in making nerve gas.
But in the immediate wake of the missile strikes, GOP Congressional leaders supported the president. A few weeks later, they began to criticize the attacks. One main line of criticism from the right was that the attacks were insufficiently robust. That's not a parallel to the current anti-administration critics, almost none of whom are seeking more aggressive engagement of al-Qaida. Instead, the attacks on Clinton as a war-monger came from his left, from the Chomskyite wing -- the same folks are yowling about Bush today.
It's worthwhile, in light of the Pakistan missile strike, to look back at the section of the 9/11 commission report that details the anguishing in American espionage and military circles in 1997 and '98 about bin Laden. They knew where he was. They knew his travel patterns. They knew he meant to do America serious harm. They drew up plans to capture or kill him. But each time, they backed off, in large part because of the risk that dozens of other people could be killed in the process -- "collateral damage."
The lead CIA officer in the field estimated the plan had a 40 percent chance of success. A Counterterrorist Center briefing put the figure at 30 percent. Acceptable odds when the downside is blowing up little children with American missiles? The White House never got to decide.
At the time, 20 or 30 innocent dead seemed too terrible a price for America to bear in pursuit of bin Laden. A little over three years later, 3,000 innocents were dead by bin Laden's orders, and thousands more have been added to the butcher's bill since then, in Madrid and Bali and London and Najaf.
Kevin Drum, the Sane One of the Left, poses a provocative question:
Reading in the 9/11 commission report reminds me why I never had much problem with Clinton overall, stained dress or no stained dress:
Ayup.
For the next couple of days, the story was that the strike was a failure. Either it had been was based on bad information, or the missiles hit a house where al Zawahiri could have been, but wasn't.
Editorials railed against yet another case of bungling U.S. intelligence and fresh enemies made. Yesterday, though, it took a twist and, though there are no bodies to show, Pakistan now says four important al-Qaida leaders died in the attack. Time and grave-digging will tell whether this was so. Let's hope it is.
What was so predictable that it required no digging was the anti-war reaction to all this. First came the big pile-on. Tigerhawk picks some typical examples:
"At least when Clinton 'lobbed cruise missiles at tents' he wasn't blowing up entire innocent families in small villages who had no idea what was about to happen to them."
"Yet the GOP/Media Axis is still frantically trying to spin the murder of innocent men, women and children as a Good Thing."
"What this strike has achieved is the further alienation of Pakistan, and provided further proof of the Bush administration's utter ineptitude. It's a reminder that the disastrous Iraq debacle diverted resources from the critical effort to contain al-Qaeda and calls into question exactly what it is that our intelligence agencies are doing."
And so forth. Tigerhawk notes:
Interestingly, scrolling through perhaps a dozen big lefty blogs, I did not see a single post that actually expressed regret that we had not killed al Zawahiri. Most of the posts were almost gleeful that we had apparently missed again, and almost all focused on the "innocent" people who had died (to which I refer you to my discussion of the proper measure of culpability in that regard).
Yes, I can attest to that, too. The most intense of the anti-war crowd I work with was positively gleeful over the morbid error, when it was thought to be such. It dispelled all his doubt (and lovely silence) after France rattled its nuclear sabre and upset the neat ordering of his world into Cowboy Warmonger Shrubbie vs. All the Good People Everywhere.
Then when he saw the headline that told of al-Qaida deaths in the attack, he refused to believe it: "Boy, they're really trying to spin this one!" He'd rather see dead innocents, as long as they are held against America, than dead terrorists.
Tigerhawk again:
The uncompromising left really should do a better job of concealing its quite obvious hope that Bush fails in every aspect of the prosecution of this war. It almost makes it hard for us to believe that they support the troops, fer Chrissakes, and they certainly don't want us laboring under that impression.
Some of the commentators Tigerhawk quotes drew parallels to the Clinton missile strike on a Sudanese target after the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He ordered a missile strike against Al Shifa, a Khartoum pharmaceutical plant which intelligence reports said was manufacturing a precursor ingredient for nerve gas with Bin Ladin’s financial support.
Once again, the balancing act between uncertain intelligence and certain fears is worth watching. The same discussions, with different nouns, played out in the Bush Administration before the Iraq war. From the 9/11 commission report:
Ever since March 1995, American officials had had in the backs of their minds Aum Shinrikyo’s release of sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway. President Clinton himself had expressed great concern about chemical and biological terrorism in the United States. Bin Ladin had reportedly been heard to speak of wanting a “Hiroshima” and at least 10,000 casualties. The CIA reported that a soil sample from the vicinity of the al Shifa plant had tested positive for EMPTA, a precursor chemical for VX, a nerve gas whose lone use was for mass killing. Two days before the embassy bombings, Clarke’s staff wrote that Bin Ladin “has invested in and almost certainly has access to VX produced at a plant in Sudan.” Senior State Department officials believed that they had received a similar verdict independently, though they and Clarke’s staff were probably relying on the same report. Mary McCarthy, the NSC senior director responsible for intelligence programs, initially cautioned Berger that the “bottom line” was that “we will need much better intelligence on this facility before we seriously consider any options.” She added that the link between Bin Ladin and al Shifa was “rather uncertain at this point.” Berger has told us that he thought about what might happen if the decision went against hitting al Shifa, and nerve gas was used in a New York subway two weeks later.
[emphasis added]
In fact, no evidence has since emerged to corroborate the CIA's view that this plant was involved in making nerve gas.
But in the immediate wake of the missile strikes, GOP Congressional leaders supported the president. A few weeks later, they began to criticize the attacks. One main line of criticism from the right was that the attacks were insufficiently robust. That's not a parallel to the current anti-administration critics, almost none of whom are seeking more aggressive engagement of al-Qaida. Instead, the attacks on Clinton as a war-monger came from his left, from the Chomskyite wing -- the same folks are yowling about Bush today.
It's worthwhile, in light of the Pakistan missile strike, to look back at the section of the 9/11 commission report that details the anguishing in American espionage and military circles in 1997 and '98 about bin Laden. They knew where he was. They knew his travel patterns. They knew he meant to do America serious harm. They drew up plans to capture or kill him. But each time, they backed off, in large part because of the risk that dozens of other people could be killed in the process -- "collateral damage."
A compound of about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a 10-foot wall, Tarnak Farms was located in an isolated desert area on the outskirts of the Kandahar airport. CIA officers were able to map the entire site, identifying the houses that belonged to Bin Ladin’s wives and the one where Bin Ladin himself was most likely to sleep. Working with the tribals, they drew up plans for the raid. They ran two complete rehearsals in the United States during the fall of 1997.
Briefing papers prepared by the Counterterrorist Center acknowledged that hitches might develop. People might be killed, and Bin Ladin’s supporters might retaliate, perhaps taking U.S. citizens in Kandahar hostage. But the briefing papers also noted that there was risk in not acting. “Sooner or later,” they said, “Bin Ladin will attack U.S. interests, perhaps using WMD.”
The lead CIA officer in the field estimated the plan had a 40 percent chance of success. A Counterterrorist Center briefing put the figure at 30 percent. Acceptable odds when the downside is blowing up little children with American missiles? The White House never got to decide.
The decision was made not to go ahead with the operation. “Mike” cabled the field that he had been directed to “stand down on the operation for the time being.” He had been told, he wrote, that cabinet-level officials thought the risk of civilian casualties—“collateral damage”—was too high. They were concerned about the tribals’ safety, and had worried that “the purpose and nature of the operation would be subject to unavoidable misinterpretation and misrepresentation—and probably recriminations—in the event that Bin Ladin, despite our best intentions and efforts, did not survive.”
At the time, 20 or 30 innocent dead seemed too terrible a price for America to bear in pursuit of bin Laden. A little over three years later, 3,000 innocents were dead by bin Laden's orders, and thousands more have been added to the butcher's bill since then, in Madrid and Bali and London and Najaf.
Kevin Drum, the Sane One of the Left, poses a provocative question:
For the sake of argument, let's assume that we had pretty good intelligence telling us that a bunch of al-Qaeda leaders were in the house we bombed. And let's also assume that we did indeed kill al-Masri and several other major al-Qaeda leaders. Finally, let's assume that the 18 civilians killed in the attack were genuinely innocent bystanders with no connection to terrorists.
Question: Under those assumptions, was the attack justified? I think the answer is pretty plainly yes, but I'd sure like to see the liberal blogosphere discuss it. And for those who answer no, I'm curious: under what circumstances would such an attack be justified?
Reading in the 9/11 commission report reminds me why I never had much problem with Clinton overall, stained dress or no stained dress:
Everyone involved in the decision had, of course, been aware of President Clinton’s problems. He told them to ignore them. Berger recalled the President saying to him “that they were going to get crap either way, so they should do the right thing.”
Ayup.
