Long Telegram from Baghdad
George F. Kennan's Long Telegram is one of the seminal documents of the 20th century. It deserves a place in the national pantheon; if there was a declaration of war in the Cold War, it was Stalin's speech in the Bolshoi in February 1946; if there is a defiant, measured American response to that declaration, this is it.
Kennan was a Soviet affairs expert serving as attaché in the U.S. embassy in Moscow in the 1940s. As World War II drew to a close, the U.S. State Department and important American politicians such as Henry Wallace and, for a time, President Roosevelt himself considered Stalin trustworthy and the Soviet Union an honest ally. Kennan, who had seen the effects of Soviet policies and heard Stalin's speeches to the home crowd, knew otherwise. In February 1946, Kennan wrote an 8,000-word telegram to the State Department, outlining what he saw as the communist government's world designs and outlining a plan to "contain" its aggressions. The "Long Telegram" helped shape U.S. policy -- ultimately successful -- in the Cold War.
The Long Telegram was widely read in Washington, and Kennan published it anonymously as an article in Foreign Affairs. The part that interests me, in terms of current events, is the conclusion, where he outlines what the U.S. ought to do, and more importantly, the spirit and attitude in which it ought to be done.
I don't think the Soviet Union and al Qaida are parallel cases. I don't think "containment" is going to work in this case. Yet there's good advice in here, because much of this is about America, not Stalin. And Americans tend to make the same mistakes when they go into a war.
Right. I've been as guilty of this, in the current case, as anyone. I've allowed myself to be drawn into the "why do they hate us" debate, which says it's either because we support Israeli military policies and Arab dictators, or because the fundamentalists hate our freedom and secular way of life.
When you step back and take a breath, it's certainly both, in a front-burner, back-burner way. Bin Laden is focused on us because of our force and policies in the Middle East. He wants us out of there, so he can re-establish the caliphate and destroy Israel. But what then? Is it conceivable that he'd stop at that, once he controlled Pakistan's nukes and the Gulf's oil? That he'd run down the flag of jihad and settle down and be a good world-citizen? If the first explanation is true, does that mean the second should not concern us at all?
Section two of Kennan's conclusion is about leveling with the American public about the "realities of Russian situation." In the wake of Sept. 11, 2001, this doesn't seem such a pressing problem in the current case.
Ironically, America's wars always have made it a better place -- by which I mean not militarily stronger, but more true to its ideals. Though in the short-term, wars contract our civil right, in the long term they expand them. In part, this is because the rhetorical attacks of our enemies -- be it the British critique of slave-dealers fighting for "liberty," the Southern fire-eaters' attack on Northern industrial labor conditions, or the Soviet propaganda about Jim Crow -- shame us into being better.
This has only begun to happen in the current case. The acceptance of Muslim Americans into the melting pot is an important step. Much of that work is being done by the left and the anti-war segment of our culture, though the Bush Administration has at least said all the right things. But more could be done.
What else? We stand out against the theocracy of the Islamists in our open, secular society. Which is why I think, in the long run, the connection between a fair acceptance of, say, gays and lesbians in the American scene is part of the war on Islamist terror. If our war aims hammer home the plight of women under the Taliban, of religious minorities in Iran, or the criminalizing of homosexuals in theocratic Saudi Arabia, that forces us to put our own house in order in those categories, lest we be hypocrites.
That's a severe warning. Not only have we failed to articulate our vision, most of the world's public opinion regards us as a greater threat than our enemies in this war! The people who are "less interested in abstract freedom than in security," and who are "seeking guidance rather than responsibilities" today are not in Europe. They are in Iraq. And they are not getting the security. Every jihadist car bomb that detonates in some market or funeral is a defeat for our purpose, even if the Iraqi people understand who did this to them.
No further elaboration needed on that one.
Kennan was a Soviet affairs expert serving as attaché in the U.S. embassy in Moscow in the 1940s. As World War II drew to a close, the U.S. State Department and important American politicians such as Henry Wallace and, for a time, President Roosevelt himself considered Stalin trustworthy and the Soviet Union an honest ally. Kennan, who had seen the effects of Soviet policies and heard Stalin's speeches to the home crowd, knew otherwise. In February 1946, Kennan wrote an 8,000-word telegram to the State Department, outlining what he saw as the communist government's world designs and outlining a plan to "contain" its aggressions. The "Long Telegram" helped shape U.S. policy -- ultimately successful -- in the Cold War.
The Long Telegram was widely read in Washington, and Kennan published it anonymously as an article in Foreign Affairs. The part that interests me, in terms of current events, is the conclusion, where he outlines what the U.S. ought to do, and more importantly, the spirit and attitude in which it ought to be done.
I don't think the Soviet Union and al Qaida are parallel cases. I don't think "containment" is going to work in this case. Yet there's good advice in here, because much of this is about America, not Stalin. And Americans tend to make the same mistakes when they go into a war.
(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.
Right. I've been as guilty of this, in the current case, as anyone. I've allowed myself to be drawn into the "why do they hate us" debate, which says it's either because we support Israeli military policies and Arab dictators, or because the fundamentalists hate our freedom and secular way of life.
When you step back and take a breath, it's certainly both, in a front-burner, back-burner way. Bin Laden is focused on us because of our force and policies in the Middle East. He wants us out of there, so he can re-establish the caliphate and destroy Israel. But what then? Is it conceivable that he'd stop at that, once he controlled Pakistan's nukes and the Gulf's oil? That he'd run down the flag of jihad and settle down and be a good world-citizen? If the first explanation is true, does that mean the second should not concern us at all?
Section two of Kennan's conclusion is about leveling with the American public about the "realities of Russian situation." In the wake of Sept. 11, 2001, this doesn't seem such a pressing problem in the current case.
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.
Ironically, America's wars always have made it a better place -- by which I mean not militarily stronger, but more true to its ideals. Though in the short-term, wars contract our civil right, in the long term they expand them. In part, this is because the rhetorical attacks of our enemies -- be it the British critique of slave-dealers fighting for "liberty," the Southern fire-eaters' attack on Northern industrial labor conditions, or the Soviet propaganda about Jim Crow -- shame us into being better.
This has only begun to happen in the current case. The acceptance of Muslim Americans into the melting pot is an important step. Much of that work is being done by the left and the anti-war segment of our culture, though the Bush Administration has at least said all the right things. But more could be done.
What else? We stand out against the theocracy of the Islamists in our open, secular society. Which is why I think, in the long run, the connection between a fair acceptance of, say, gays and lesbians in the American scene is part of the war on Islamist terror. If our war aims hammer home the plight of women under the Taliban, of religious minorities in Iran, or the criminalizing of homosexuals in theocratic Saudi Arabia, that forces us to put our own house in order in those categories, lest we be hypocrites.
(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.
That's a severe warning. Not only have we failed to articulate our vision, most of the world's public opinion regards us as a greater threat than our enemies in this war! The people who are "less interested in abstract freedom than in security," and who are "seeking guidance rather than responsibilities" today are not in Europe. They are in Iraq. And they are not getting the security. Every jihadist car bomb that detonates in some market or funeral is a defeat for our purpose, even if the Iraqi people understand who did this to them.
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.
No further elaboration needed on that one.
