Brooks on Duelfer

The New York Times' hothouse flower, resident conservative columnist, weighs in on the report. Like many others, he says the media coverage of it is topsy-turvy. The fact that Saddam didn't, in fact, have stockpiles of WMD has been told before. The rest of it had never been pieced together with such clarity:

The world lacked what Saddam had: the long perspective. Saddam understood that what others see as a defeat or a setback can really be a glorious victory if it is seen in the context of the longer epic.

Saddam worked patiently to undermine the sanctions. He stored the corpses of babies in great piles, and then unveiled them all at once in great processions to illustrate the great humanitarian horrors of the sanctions.

Saddam personally made up a list of officials at the U.N., in France, in Russia and elsewhere who would be bribed. He sent out his oil ministers to curry favor with China, France, Turkey and Russia. He established illicit trading relations with Ukraine, Syria, North Korea and other nations to rebuild his arsenal.

It was all working. He acquired about $11 billion through illicit trading. He used the oil-for-food billions to build palaces. His oil minister was treated as a "rock star," as the report put it, at international events, so thick was the lust to trade with Iraq.

France, Russia, China and other nations lobbied to lift sanctions. Saddam was, as the Duelfer report noted, "palpably close" to ending sanctions.

With sanctions weakening and money flowing, he rebuilt his strength. He contacted W.M.D. scientists in Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria and elsewhere to enhance his technical knowledge base. He increased the funds for his nuclear scientists. He increased his military-industrial-complex's budget 40-fold between 1996 and 2002. He increased the number of technical research projects to 3,200 from 40. As Duelfer reports, "Prohibited goods and weapons were being shipped into Iraq with virtually no problem."

Yet the headlines all said "Report: Saddam had no WMD." And the stories talked about "undercutting the administration's stated reason for going to war with Iraq." And that was about it. If you found "the rest of it," it was on page A30. Or not reported until days later (as in our newspaper), as though it was a separate report, not nearly as important as the Duelfer report.

I have never in my life seen a government report so distorted by partisan passions. The fact that Saddam had no W.M.D. in 2001 has been amply reported, but it's been isolated from the more important and complicated fact of Saddam's nature and intent.

But we know where things were headed. Sanctions would have been lifted. Saddam, rich, triumphant and unbalanced, would have reconstituted his W.M.D. Perhaps he would have joined a nuclear arms race with Iran. Perhaps he would have left it all to his pathological heir Qusay.

We can argue about what would have been the best way to depose Saddam, but this report makes it crystal clear that this insatiable tyrant needed to be deposed. He was the menace, and, as the world dithered, he was winning his struggle. He was on the verge of greatness. We would all now be living in his nightmare.

Mushroom Clouds

From the Washington Post preview of the Duelfer report.

The official said Duelfer will tell Congress in the report and in testimony today that Hussein intended to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction programs if he were freed of the U.N. sanctions that prevented him from getting needed materials.

Duelfer's report said Hussein was pursuing an aggressive effort to subvert the international sanctions through illegal financing and procurement efforts, officials said. The official said the report states that Hussein had the intent to resume full-scale weapons of mass destruction efforts after the sanctions were eliminated, and details Hussein's efforts to hinder international inspectors and preserve his weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

Now, take your contempt for Chimpler out of the picture, and weigh that conclusion against the way sanctions were cracking apart in early 2000s under pressure of international "humanitarians" on the one hand and international oil-for-food scammers on the other.

You can argue about Bush's timing and motives, but I just don't see how anyone can make out that Saddam wasn't a threat -- a short-term threat if not an immediate one (and we didn't know then what we know now).

Unless maybe you're Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.).

"Intentions do not constitute a growing danger," Harman said. "It's hardly mushroom clouds, hardly stockpiles," she added.

The Post feels compelled to soften up her quote by explaining it as "a reference to administration rhetoric used in the run-up to the war." But she doesn't say that. She's waiting for proof of "danger." Proof, for her, is mushroom clouds (or silos full of mushroom cloud-makers). If that's the "global test," I'd like to switch to a different class.