Once More

LTC Linda J. M. Holloway, a United States Army Reservist with 22 years experience, is currently serving in Iraq as a Civil Affairs Officer on an ePRT, which stands for Embedded Reconstruction Team, near the town of Haditha. During her many meetings with local Iraqis since the start of her tour in October, 2007, LTC Holloway has realized that "[t]he rebuilding of Iraq is more than just mortar and bricks; it is the rebuilding of people’s lives that have been devastated by the many years of war in Iraq...There is indeed a cry for help and it is the cry of the "War Widows."

And so she started something. And you can help her with it.

It hasn't sunk in to everyone yet, because some have pinned their reputation on the meme of "fiasco and failure," like the U.S. Democrats of 1862 or the British opposition of 1812:

"No man in his senses," said Sir Francis Burdett, " could entertain a hope of the final success of our arms in the Peninsula. Our laurels were great, but barren, and our victories in their effects mere defeats."

But a large and important swath of Iraq has seen a major drop in violence, in part due to the "surge," in part due to the Sunnis turning on al Qaida, and, to a lesser extent, the Shi'ites rejecting the militias.

This is not peace by a long shot, or even success. A lot of it happened without our intention, but that's always the case in a war. What this could be is one of those "end of the beginning" moments. It is not success, but it could clear the path for it. It is success on the tribal level that happens without reference to, or in spite of, the supposed government of that country. For it to be real success, either the government will have to be infected with the same attitudes, or it will have to be replaced, hopefully at the next election. The swerve toward stability can't last unless that happens.

And it can't happen if the American forces suddenly drop out of the picture. Yet every politician, even Bush, is talking about a draw-down of some sort, sensing the voting public has lost the will to advance the cause of the Iraqi people.

Do something. Don't wait for the politicians to lead; they never will. Tens of thousands of our former enemies in Iraq are now working with us. That move was forced on them by the insolent barbarity of the Islamists whom they mistook for their friends. Their friendship with us is so far a matter mostly of convenience. But it can be won in fact if they discover our concern for their lives and futures and our mutual commitment to their prosperity and liberty.

Spirit of America, which I linked above, has done valuable work since the start of the occupation on humanitarian projects in Iraq, reacting to what the military men and women in the country identify as needs and opportunities. In so many cases in the Sunni region, it has cast its seeds on barren soil. Now, however, the seeds might take root.

If you've all but given up on the country, rally what you have left of that original spirit. The sacrifice in this war has touched a few American families intensely and most not at all. Give a little. There's a whole shelf of books written lately by anti-war people describing in excruciating detail how the Sunni Iraqis will never be anything but implacable foes of America. Here's your chance to send them into the remainder bin before the ink is even dry.

Neo-Insurgents

[posted by Callimachus]

Martin J. Muckian's article on the Iraqi insurgency has been widely cited and praised in the sites that generally pay attention to military wonkery and defense policy publications.

It ought to get even wider circulation than that. Enough hot air might be spared about Vietnam and Malaysia and Greece and Nicaragua to stave off global warming for a decade.

A modern, networked insurgency, such as the one in Iraq, is structurally very different from the Maoist movements of the twentieth century. Simply rehashing old strategies will not work. An effective counterinsurgency needs to understand the structure of this new insurgency and adapt its strategies accordingly.

The first step is to understand that the enemy is a network, not a hierarchy. Imposing a hierarchical framework on an amorphous organization will only hinder efforts. As Georgetown University’s Professor Bruce Hoffman writes, “The problem in Iraq is that there appears to be no such static wiring diagram or organizational structure to identify, unravel, and systematically dismantle.”

The next step is to understand that networks are very difficult to destroy, but they can be disrupted. As Dr. Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen stated, operations should focus on “fracturing, delinking, and deresourcing” the insurgency. Several avenues for disrupting the insurgent network have been discussed in this article—critical nodes, narrative, support sources, and information technology.

First, attack critical nodes for maximum disruptive effect. Modern insurgencies do not have a hierarchy that can be pulled apart. Targeting the ostensible leadership is not likely to have a significant disruptive effect. People or cells with special skills or who act as critical communication links or perform non-redundant functions are key vulnerabilities of a network.

Second, networked insurgencies do not necessarily have strong political cohesion. Attack the narrative by forcing the insurgency to respond to issues that are outside its scope—this can disrupt or even fracture the movement as each group responds to the issue according to its own ideology. Ideological differences are a primary cause of fracturing within networked groups. A counterinsurgency should take every opportunity to disrupt its adversary by promoting internal dissension.

Third, attack the sources of support. This cannot be done effectively through traditional population control measures; the counterinsurgency must understand where the movement obtains its resources. This may involve international cooperation to stop overseas funding streams. Given that insurgencies are increasingly turning to crime for financing, priority should be given to reducing crime and corruption in an effort to disrupt insurgent financing.

Fourth, attack the information technology infrastructure of the network. A network is absolutely dependent on robust communications to function. It may be that information technology controls are the modern equivalent of the population controls that were used so successfully against Maoist insurgencies. One extreme proposal is to completely shut down the information technology grid in the insurgent areas—telephones, cellular towers, and so on. This could certainly have a disruptive effect on a networked organization, but more research is needed in this critical area.

This is not just an Iraq problem, of course. This is the new face of the global battlefield for America, and it ought to be in the minds of a great many people who seem only dimly aware of it, from the purchasers at the Pentagon to the activists taking out full-page NYT ads insisting President Bush do something about the genocide in Darfur.

As a minor aside to all this, is it possible that spontaneous horizontal networks of military and non-military individuals with common goals could be a terrificly effective tool in counter-insurgency?

This is a story of can-do in a no-can-do world, a story of how a Marine officer in Iraq, a small network-design company in California, a nonprofit troop-support group, a blogger and other undeterrable folk designed a handheld insurgent-identification device, built it, shipped it and deployed it in Anbar province. They did this in 30 days, from Dec. 15 to Jan. 15. Compared to standard operating procedure for Iraq, this is a nanosecond.

Sometimes, maybe, whether you win or lose on a battlefield really does have nothing to do with who's in the White House or how competent he or she is. And perhaps the proud, contributing members of the Spirit of America network could point out to their chickenhawk-squawking detractors that, in some cases, they also serve who only stand and wait.

What Went Wrong

[posted by Callimachus]

Spirit of America has always, to me, represented the best of what we went to Iraq to do. It is independent of the military, but works closely with it. It has a high sense of spiritual mission, but is not faith-based. Soldiers and marines in the field initiate the ideas, civilians contribute the funds, and the organization makes it happen.

Of all the charitable donations my wife and I have made the last three years, probably more has gone to SoA than any other destination, unless it be Mennonite Central Committee. Two years ago, I think it was, I asked those who would not be offended by the request to, instead of buying me a Christmas present, donate the amount they would have spent to one of two SoA causes. One of them was the one here described in Ramadi:

My main question back in Ramadi was “how can we help?” That’s the same question I arrived with at Camp Pendleton last week.

In our meeting, as he has many times via email, General Mattis thanked Spirit of America and our donors for supporting the Marines’ efforts to stabilize and bring some improvement to Iraq. He said our support was far beyond any expectations they had. And, he talked quite a bit about the women’s sewing centers for which SoA provided sewing machines. ...

The sewing centers were a particularly high impact project in Gen Mattis’ view. They included day care, computer training and, of course, the ability for women to sew and make some money to support themselves. They also included a “tips” line where an Iraqi woman could make a call to report insurgent/terrorist activity. General Mattis said he knew the “tips” line was used and, although no one can know how many lives were saved, it had an impact. I’ve heard many similar stories, when a small act of kindness led to assistance or information that could save lives.

And for a time it worked. But not for long enough.

Unfortunately, like many symbols of progress, the sewing center in Ramadi was attacked and destroyed by insurgents (it was bombed at night when no one was working there). Gen Mattis thought the sewing center in Habbaniyah was still operating but the Marines had not visited it in some time.

A pile of rubble. Well, my old junior high school is a pile of rubble now, too. It had a motto over the door: "Enter to learn, go forth to serve." I still remember that. The school building is gone, but not its lesson. And its destruction in that case was not much of a lesson, but, perhaps, in Ramadi, women and men walk past the rubble and the twisted machinery every day and remember the choice, the forking path of their nation's future.

Perhaps. Or perhaps it is just a lot of rusted metal and cinder-dust. Did the tip line have anything to do with the "insurgents' " demolition? Who can say? Any more than we can really be sure, without evidence, it was insurgents and not, say, jealous husbands, who blew the thing up.

Was it wise to include a tip line in the whole project? Some would say it wasn't. But there's an argument to be made, too, that the successful path for Iraq up and out of its own prison would have to include not just economic opportunities but a deliberate rejection of the thuggish and backwards goals of the insurgents.

... It was very clear that our sticking by him and his men and women, offering support through thick and thin, meant a great, great deal to him. General Mattis also talked about the difficulty of rebuilding and humanitarian projects in Iraq today. The level of violence is such that the desired linkage between “good deeds and good results” is sometimes broken. Nonetheless, these good deeds do bridge gaps and help improve relations.

I'm now reduced to hope, then, that it all was for something. Some in the military will come home and know that there really was a homefront that was trying to work with them to the best of its ability, and it wasn't all camped out with "Peace Mom." And in Iraq, the story will never be on Al-Jazeera or on CNN, but maybe a few people in that community will remember the Americans came there to do something for them. And they'll pick up the pieces on their own.