Monday, March 07, 2005

The Ransom of Red Chief

The killing of Nicola Calipari is just tragic. I wish I could personally say I'm sorry to his wife and two teen-age children and to all Italians for the loss of what was, by all accounts, a brave and good man.

On a less personal level, you couldn't have scripted a worse scene for the United States. One of my co-workers ventured that thought last night. Another thought about it, fetching for a worse scene, and said, "they could have killed her." To which the first replied, "then she wouldn't be talking." They're not Ann Coulter; they voted for Kerry; they can say things like that.

But I'm still waiting for the American anti-war forces, which do not have the excuse of trying to see through the tears of anger and grief, to give a coherent account of exactly what they think happened on that highway. An account that satisfies all the various conspiracies and perfidies they attribute to the United States as a result of this. Hell, I'm waiting for a version of events from them that simply 1. fits the facts, and 2. is internally consistent.

Their triumphalism is every bit as illogical as that on my other side when it credits the Bush administration for, say, progress in Palestinian democracy, when that had to do more with that incorrigible terrorist Arafat going where the woodbine twineth. The U.S. commitment to democracy in Arab and Muslim countries (compromised as it may be in the minds of many) does have an effect -- imagine events there if the U.S. attitude was "do whatever you want, we don't care."

And needless to say, triumphalism over the progress of democracy and freedom has a higher odor than triumphalism over the death of innocent people.

But you'd think the people who honed their skills in applying hot pokers to the logical progressions of the Bush Administration's argument for overthrowing Saddam would be able to do better in building their own arguments. You'd think.

Via Joe Gandelman, who has a full plate of links and more background than any single news story I've read, I find Andrew Olmsted's take on it, which begins to parse out the logic of the scenarios. His background in exactly this kind of roadblock also helps:

I've been training Iraq-bound units on how to run traffic control points (TCPs) just like the one that fired on Ms. Sgrena's vehicle for most of the past year. The biggest threat such units face is a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (i.e. a car bomb) detonating in their midst, so the TCPs are designed to stop vehicles well away from their center, allowing the minimum number of soldiers to risk contact with an approaching vehicle. Vehicles which approach a TCP and fail to stop are dealt with very simply: they are engaged with rifle and machine gun fire because they may be VBIEDs which could destroy the entire TCP. Because this threatens to lead to accidental killings like that involving Ms. Sgrena, we warn units to place signs well forward of the TCP telling drivers they are approaching a TCP and need to slow down and stop or they will be fired upon. The TCP is a delicate balance between protection of the soldiers manning the TCP and protecting the innocent people who come through the TCP.

Now we're offered two competing versions of what happened. Ms. Sgrena has implied that the U.S. didn't want her released, so the soldiers were ordered to fire on her car to eliminate her. The U.S. has claimed that the Italian car approached the TCP at high speed while refusing to stop and the soldiers therefore engaged it, killing Mr. Calipari. Which of these stories is more likely to be accurate (although neither is likely to be 100% accurate, since they are both first reports)?

Ms. Sgrena's account would require that the United States be aware of the negotiations with the terrorists and that they knew not only that she was about to be released, but the route she would taken out along. They then set up an ambush along that route with the express purpose of killing Ms. Sgrena, firing at her car without warning. Then the death squad stopped firing before killing Ms. Sgrena and treated her wounds before turning her over to Italian authorities.

The U.S. account would require that the Italian agents were in a hurry to get Ms. Sgrena to safety, and that they failed to slow for a U.S. checkpoint possibly because they knew that the Italian car did not present a threat to the Americans and that the Italians and Americans are working together in Iraq. Forgetting that the Americans at the TCP could not know that, they failed to slow down in a timely fashion and were engaged, resulting in the tragic death of Mr. Calipari.


Luke and I traveled through France, Germany, and Italy two years ago. OF the three, Italy was by far the most virulently anti-war and anti-American (though the Italians, as individuals, were pleasant to us personally). We walked back and forth to our hotel in Venice past a wall scrawled with huge red letters "Americans are murderers." I was glad Luke didn't speak enough Italian to get that.

I appreciate the political risks Berlusconi took to be on our side in this. I value the contribution the Italians have made to the coalition, which, unlike many members, amounts to more than just providing another flag.

But is it really worthwhile to continue a coalition when the members have essentially different approaches to key matters such as whether to pay off hostage-takers? How many Americans and Iraqis -- perhaps also British or Italians -- will be killed by whatever toys these thugs buy with the millions they apparently received to hand back their Red Chief, Giuliana Sgrena?