The Battle of Japan
Of all the hypothetical histories, Operation Olympic, the American invasion of Japan, is perhaps the most hotly contested. On it hinge two popular, and clashing, certainties about American power.
The first says it is essentially bloodthirsty and genocidal, that Truman A-bombed a Japan he knew was on the brink of collapse led by men yearning to surrender, and that he did so because he wanted to impress the Soviets with America's new weapon. The other holds that the bomb put a quick end to a long war, and, through the cruel calculations of the god of battles, the deaths of tens of thousands in a few minutes in two cities spared the lives of hundreds of thousands -- U.S. GIs, Japanese civilians, starving slave laborers, occupied Indonesians -- by convincing Japan to stop fighting at once. In this view, America can be ruthlessly efficient in war, but not radically more violent than is necessary to win.
No blood ever was spilt in the U.S. invasion of Japan that never happened. But historians have spilled gallons of ink over it in the years since. With the 60th anniversary of the event passing rather quietly this week, World War II historian Richard B. Frank revisits the record -- including secret transcripts still coming to light -- and offers some insight into "Why Truman Dropped the Bomb."
The first says it is essentially bloodthirsty and genocidal, that Truman A-bombed a Japan he knew was on the brink of collapse led by men yearning to surrender, and that he did so because he wanted to impress the Soviets with America's new weapon. The other holds that the bomb put a quick end to a long war, and, through the cruel calculations of the god of battles, the deaths of tens of thousands in a few minutes in two cities spared the lives of hundreds of thousands -- U.S. GIs, Japanese civilians, starving slave laborers, occupied Indonesians -- by convincing Japan to stop fighting at once. In this view, America can be ruthlessly efficient in war, but not radically more violent than is necessary to win.
No blood ever was spilt in the U.S. invasion of Japan that never happened. But historians have spilled gallons of ink over it in the years since. With the 60th anniversary of the event passing rather quietly this week, World War II historian Richard B. Frank revisits the record -- including secret transcripts still coming to light -- and offers some insight into "Why Truman Dropped the Bomb."
What this evidence illuminates is that one central tenet of the traditionalist view is wrong--but with a twist. Even with the full ration of caution that any historian should apply anytime he ventures comments on paths history did not take, in this instance it is now clear that the long-held belief that Operation Olympic loomed as a certainty is mistaken. Truman's reluctant endorsement of the Olympic invasion at a meeting in June 1945 was based in key part on the fact that the Joint Chiefs had presented it as their unanimous recommendation. (King went along with Marshall at the meeting, presumably because he deemed it premature to wage a showdown fight. He did comment to Truman that, of course, any invasion authorized then could be canceled later.) With the Navy's withdrawal of support, the terrible casualties in Okinawa, and the appalling radio-intelligence picture of the Japanese buildup on Kyushu, Olympic was not going forward as planned and authorized--period.
But this evidence also shows that the demise of Olympic came not because it was deemed unnecessary, but because it had become unthinkable. It is hard to imagine anyone who could have been president at the time (a spectrum that includes FDR, Henry Wallace, William O. Douglas, Harry Truman, and Thomas Dewey) failing to authorize use of the atomic bombs in this circumstance.
Japanese historians uncovered another key element of the story. After Hiroshima (August 6), Soviet entry into the war against Japan (August 8), and Nagasaki (August 9), the emperor intervened to break a deadlock within the government and decide that Japan must surrender in the early hours of August 10. The Japanese Foreign Ministry dispatched a message to the United States that day stating that Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration, "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." This was not, as critics later asserted, merely a humble request that the emperor retain a modest figurehead role. As Japanese historians writing decades after the war emphasized, the demand that there be no compromise of the "prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler" as a precondition for the surrender was a demand that the United States grant the emperor veto power over occupation reforms and continue the rule of the old order in Japan. Fortunately, Japan specialists in the State Department immediately realized the actual purpose of this language and briefed Secretary of State James Byrnes, who insisted properly that this maneuver must be defeated.
The maneuver further underscores the fact that right to the very end, the Japanese pursued twin goals: not only the preservation of the imperial system, but also preservation of the old order in Japan that had launched a war of aggression that killed 17 million.
Labels: Japan, World War II
